arXiv:2605.05329v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Safety policies define what constitutes safe and unsafe AI outputs, guiding data annotation and model development. However, annotation disagreement is pervasive and can stem from multiple sources such as operational failures (annotators misunderstand or misexecute the task), policy ambiguity (policy wording leaves room for interpretation), or value pluralism (different annotators hold different perspectives on safety). Distinguishing these sources matters. For example, operational failures call for quality control, ambiguity calls for policy clarification, and pluralism calls for deliberation about incorporating diverse perspectives. Yet understanding why annotators disagree is difficult. Directly asking annotators for their reasoning is costly, substantially increasing annotation burden, and can be unreliable for both human and LLM annotators as self-reported reasoning often fails to reflect actual decision processes.
We introduce Annotator Policy Models (APMs), interpretable models that learn annotators’ internal safety policies from labeling behavior alone, making annotator reasoning visible and comparable without additional annotation effort. We validate that APMs accurately model annotator safety policy (>80% accuracy), faithfully predict responses to counterfactual edits, and recover known policy differences in controlled settings. Applying APMs to LLM and human annotations, we demonstrate two core applications: (1) surfacing policy ambiguity by revealing how annotators interpret safety instructions differently, and (2) surfacing value pluralism by uncovering systematic differences in safety priorities across demographic groups. Together, these capabilities support more targeted, transparent, and inclusive safety policy design.

arXiv:2605.05365v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We present ZAYA1-8B, a reasoning-focused mixture-of-experts (MoE) model with 700M active and 8B total parameters, built on Zyphra’s MoE++ architecture. ZAYA1-8B’s core pretraining, midtraining, and supervised fine-tuning (SFT) were performed on a full-stack AMD compute, networking, and software platform. With under 1B active parameters, ZAYA1-8B matches or exceeds DeepSeek-R1-0528 on several challenging mathematics and coding benchmarks, and remains competitive with substantially larger open-weight reasoning models. ZAYA1-8B was trained from scratch for reasoning, with reasoning data included from pretraining onward using an answer-preserving trimming scheme. Post-training uses a four-stage RL cascade: reasoning warmup on math and puzzles; a 400-task RLVE-Gym curriculum; math and code RL with test-time compute traces and synthetic code environments built from competitive-programming references; and behavioral RL for chat and instruction following. We also introduce Markovian RSA, a test-time compute method that recursively aggregates parallel reasoning traces while carrying forward only bounded-length reasoning tails between rounds. In TTC evaluation, Markovian RSA raises ZAYA1-8B to 91.9% on AIME’25 and 89.6% on HMMT’25 while carrying forward only a 4K-token tail, narrowing the gap to much larger reasoning models including Gemini-2.5 Pro, DeepSeek-V3.2, and GPT-5-High.

arXiv:2605.05379v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Enterprise agents increasingly operate inside scoped retrieval systems, delegated workflows, and policy-constrained evidence environments. In these settings, access control can be enforced correctly while the system still produces an answer that appears complete even though material evidence lies outside the caller’s authorization boundary. This paper introduces Partial Evidence Bench, a deterministic benchmark for measuring that failure mode. The benchmark ships three scenario families — due diligence, compliance audit, and security incident response — with 72 tasks total, ACL-partitioned corpora, oracle complete answers, oracle authorized-view answers, oracle completeness judgments, and structured gap-report oracles. It evaluates systems along four surfaces: answer correctness, completeness awareness, gap-report quality, and unsafe completeness behavior. Checked-in baselines show that silent filtering is catastrophically unsafe across all shipped families, while explicit fail-and-report behavior eliminates unsafe completeness without collapsing the task into trivial abstention. Preliminary real-model runs show model-dependent and scenario-sensitive differences in whether systems overclaim completeness, conservatively underclaim, or report incompleteness in an enterprise-usable form. The benchmark’s broader contribution is to make a governance-critical agent failure measurable without human judges or contamination-prone static corpora.

arXiv:2605.05386v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Large language models increasingly operate in interactive settings where solving a task requires multiple rounds of information exchange with a user. However, most current systems treat dialogue reactively and lack a principled mechanism to reason about what information is missing and which question should be asked next. We propose BALAR (Bayesian Agentic Loop for Active Reasoning), a task-agnostic outer-loop algorithm that requires no fine-tuning and enables structured multi-turn interaction between an LLM agent and a user. BALAR maintains a structured belief over latent states, selects clarifying questions by maximizing expected mutual information, and dynamically expands its state representation when the current one proves insufficient. We evaluate BALAR on three diverse benchmarks: AR-Bench-DC (detective cases), AR-Bench-SP (thinking puzzles), and iCraft-MD (clinical diagnosis). BALAR significantly outperforms all baselines across all three benchmarks, with $14.6%$ higher accuracy on AR-Bench-DC, $38.5%$ on AR-Bench-SP, and $30.5%$ on iCraft-MD.